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Pivot or Pirouette:  
the u.S. rebalance to aSia
Dr. Ashley J. Tellis
Thank you Professor Chandrashekar, for that kind and generous 
introduction. I am very glad to be here in Bangalore which, if memory 
serves me right, I have come back to after ten years. It is remarkable 
to see how the city has changed since I last visited, sometimes, but 
not always, for the better. 
It is great to be at NIAS. It is my first visit here. I want to thank 
Professor Ramamurthy and NIAS for inviting me. I have always 
watched the work done at NIAS with a certain degree of awe from 
a distance. As I was telling the NIAS faculty this afternoon, NIAS is 
one of the few places that has attempted to do public policy analysis 
by integrating technical work. Many of the challenges we face today 
are not simple challenges of public policy; they involve very detailed, 
recondite aspects of human knowledge. It is wonderful to have an 
institution such as NIAS, which reminds me of RAND - where I 
worked for many years - as a place where you can bring together 
technical and policy analysis in the hope of better informing the 
choices we make. 
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The subject that I am going to speak on today is somewhat remote 
from the kind of work that NIAS has focussed on, but I think is very 
important for the future of both our countries: the United States and 
India. I am going to talk about the U.S. effort that is underway to 
rebalance to Asia. It is important because it goes to the issue of what 
kind of geo-political environment is going to exist in this part of the 
world in the years to come. If we do not quite get that context right, 
then obviously the choices that it will impose on all the states that 
inhabit this region will be far more difficult. Understanding what the 
United States is trying to do, I think, is a useful first step in trying to 
assess the future of the broad Indo-Pacific region. Therefore, I am 
going to focus my remarks on this subject: understanding the genesis, 
the phenomenology and the consequences of the U.S. rebalance to 
Asia.
Why the U.S. Rebalance to Asia?
Let me start by trying to answer a very simple question. Why 
rebalance in the first place? 
The best way to answer that is to remind ourselves of a famous 
American 19th century bank robber named Willy Sutton. After a 
series of very successful bank robberies, Willy Sutton was finally 
apprehended. Like most bank robbers, I suspect, he was not a great 
intellectual. So when asked by the arresting officer why he robbed 
banks, Willy said very laconically, “because, that’s where the money 
is.” That answer captures in a nutshell why the United States is 
rebalancing to Asia. The United States is rebalancing to Asia because 
that is where the “money and the action is” in contemporary geo-
politics.
PUBLIC LECTURE: DR. ASHLEY J. TELLIS
3
I do not need to remind any of you that the broad swath of littoral 
Asia, particularly the maritime dimensions of Asia all the way from 
the North East to the Indian sub-continent, is going to be the new 
centre of gravity in the international system. In this crescent lies 
the productive motor of the global economy, many nuclear weapon 
states, unresolved rivalries, and the paradoxical intersection of 
nineteenth century balance of power struggles with twenty-first 
century patterns of economic integration. And how exactly we 
manoeuvre in this interaction between a nineteenth century world, 
which continues to define politics, and a twenty-first century world, 
which continues to define geo-economics, is going to be a challenge 
for all the countries involved. 
However, these facts have been known for a long time. Since at least 
the early 1990s it was obvious that the broad Indo-Pacific littorals 
were going to shape the future global system. There has been a 
steady shift of power as well as of productive base from the old 
Anglo-Saxon world to the new peripheries of Asia. So it has been 
easy to forecast this transformation, which was brought about by 
American investment in Asia in the aftermath of the Second World 
War. 
Why the delay in the U.S. rebalance to Asia?
So the question then is: why did it take the United States so long to 
rebalance? In 2012, the Obama Administration announced for the first 
time that it was going to be intensifying its role in the Asia-Pacific in 
a way that it had not done before. 
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At that time, the then National Security Advisor, Mr. Tom Donilon, 
offered the following explanation:
“The rebalance is ultimately oriented to making certain 
that international norms and law are respected, that 
commerce and freedom of navigation are not impeded, 
that emerging powers build trust with their neighbours 
and disagreements are resolved peacefully without 
threats or coercion.”
Apart from being a diplomatic explanation for the rebalance, it is also 
very useful. Every component of the statement has an element of truth 
which must be taken seriously. However, it is a diplomatic way of 
illumining what is a somewhat undiplomatic reality. This reality - to use 
the language of the movie Star Wars - is that, “there is a disturbance in 
the force.” This disturbance is essentially caused by the fact that there has 
been, for many years now, and will continue to be a transformation in the 
continental balance of power that could have a very serious, disruptive 
impact. This transformation has arisen because of the growth of a state 
called China. However, China is not a new state; it has been around as a 
civilization for many thousands of years. It is not even a new nation state, 
as China has been around since 1949 in its modern incarnation. But it is 
certainly true that China is a new force of geo-political consequence since 
at least the 1980s when Deng Xiaoping’s liberalisation of the Chinese 
economy led to its progressive integration with the world. 
This dramatic transformation, slowly working its way since 1978, 
has created - in China - a new power in the international system. 
In 1978, if one had to ask a U.S. policy maker whether within thirty 
years, this country would have the second largest economy in the 
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world, military capabilities capable of challenging the United States, 
and could potentially become a rival to the United States, the answer 
would have been a resounding ‘No’. 
In fact, I have argued that part of the reason that the United States 
proceeded to integrate China into the global economy post-1978 was 
because of two divergent, but complementary, drivers. First, there 
was the desire to expand the global economy and the international 
system that had been so successful as a result of America’s post-
war investments. To that degree there was a certain altruism in the 
concept. 
But there was also an expectation that, even if this integration took 
place, it would not cause any fundamental change in the geo-political 
system. Because, if the U.S. had understood in 1978 that what it was 
about to do would create this fundamental geo-political disruption, I 
am not sure American policy makers would have pursued integration 
with great enthusiasm. On the other hand, there are many things that 
the United States does out of fits of absent-mindedness, so it is entirely 
possible that the United States would have followed the policy even 
if it eventually proved to be a completely counterproductive one. 
But if the United States had fullness of imagination and presence of 
mind, I am sure U.S. decision makers would have given it at least a 
second thought. But now all that is behind us. 
The United States has made investments in Asia since 1945 that 
have sown the seeds of globalisation. Through this the United 
States has created opportunities for an international division of 
labour on an extraordinary scale. And when these opportunities 
were complemented by a very calculating, conscious strategy of 
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maximisation that was then pursued by the Chinese leadership, one 
got exactly the outcome very few in the U.S. had anticipated in 1978. 
This outcome was the rise of a new great power that is potentially a 
serious competitor to the United States in Asia and around the globe. 
Certainly by 2012, it became apparent to U.S. policy makers that 
this disruption in the traditional geo-political balance was well 
underway and that this disruption had consequences that the 
United States would have to manage. The biggest consequence 
was the fact that its treaty allies in Asia - which the United States 
was committed to defending through a solemn international 
agreement - were becoming increasingly nervous about the fact 
that the most important power center in their part of the world was 
literally at their doorsteps. Even more consequentially, this new 
power was increasingly acquiring the capability to threaten their 
security and to prevent the United States from coming to the defence 
of its allies if it needed to in a crisis. 
Thus, the United States had to confront a reality that it had last 
confronted only at the high tide of competition with the Soviet Union. 
This reality was that there was now a power in Asia which had the 
capacity to decouple the United States from its alliance partners in the 
Asian periphery. And given this reality, the United States essentially 
had the choice of doing one of two things. 
One is to walk away and accept the fact that new geo-political realities 
would prevent it from underwriting the commitments it had accepted 
in the past. The other is to make certain that it could make a comeback 
and do the things that were required of it to assure its allies that they 
did not have to succumb to the rise of new Chinese power and could 
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continue to rely on the United States as a durable security guarantor 
in Asia. This recognition had actually dawned on the United States 
long before 2012. And if you look, for example, in the pre-election 
speeches of candidate George W. Bush, you can see in those speeches 
a very clear recognition that there was a challenge emerging on the 
horizon that fundamentally revolved around the rise of China. There 
was also a recognition that the United States would have to come to 
terms with this challenge and find ways of managing it. And thus in 
the first few months of the Bush administration there was actually an 
effort made to do what would a decade later be called rebalancing. 
Unfortunately for the United States, the tragedy of 9/11 intervened. 
What 9/11 did was that it distracted the United States from what was 
the central geopolitical challenge into managing what, at the end 
of the day, in my view, is still is a peripheral challenge. This is not 
to say that terrorism is a pleasant business. It is nasty at the best of 
times and, in India, one does not have to make this point with any 
emphasis because there are very few countries in the world that have 
had to deal with the ravages of terrorism for as long as India has. But 
even you know that terrorism is not a threat that calls into question 
the survival of the nation, unless of course it is linked to things like 
weapons of mass destruction. Yet the United States, because of the 
shock of 9/11, ended up in the global campaign against terrorism, 
which of course had a lot of benefits. But unfortunately, at the end 
of the day, it resulted in a significant expenditure of American blood 
and treasure that made us more incapable of dealing with this new 
emerging power that existed on the horizon. 
Thus, by the time President Obama came into office, the United 
States had become more conscious of the fact that it had to go back 
PIVOT OR PIROUETTE: THE U.S. REBALANCE TO ASIA
8
to basics: in other words, continue to invest in advancing the most 
important geopolitical objective that the United States has had in 
Asia since the Second World War, which was to prevent the rise of a 
regional hegemon in the Eurasian landmass. The United States had 
fought a Cold War with the Soviet Union to prevent it from becoming 
that geopolitical hegemon in Eurasia. There is absolutely no reason 
why the United States can treat China any differently if China is on 
the cusp of becoming such a regional hegemon. 
So the rebalancing is really a strategic effort to go back to dealing 
with the fundamentals of the strategic situation. First, it is evidence 
of the American recognition that China’s rise is an enduring rise 
and not a flash in the pan. China is not suddenly going to disappear 
and take care of itself because of some internal crisis. Of course, 
China will have its share of internal challenges, but I think there is 
a broad judgment that the Chinese state has enough resilience to 
deal with these challenges and still ascend as a major player in the 
international system.
It is the second element of rebalancing, the objective of managing 
China’s rise, which is going to be an extremely challenging one. 
Managing China is going to be a challenging task because it requires 
the United States to simultaneously socialise, integrate, deter and 
reassure China. This is going to be very different from the challenge 
that the United States faced with the Soviet Union. Dealing with 
the Soviet Union was difficult in practical terms because it was a 
formidable and ambitious military power. But in logical terms, it 
was simple because the United States and the Soviet Union shared 
absolutely no interconnectivity except in the security arena. In the 
security arena, both countries were tightly interdependent. What the 
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Soviet Union did impacted the United States and what the United 
States did impacted the Soviet Union. But there were absolutely no 
civilizational, social or economic ties and so the United States could 
afford to treat competition with the Soviet Union as a simple zero sum 
game. And in the zero sum game, you know exactly what the Nash 
equilibrium is. It may be hard to implement the strategies required 
by that equilibrium, but you know what you have to do. And, as the 
historical record now shows, the United States did much better with 
this strategy than it had itself anticipated. 
Speaking parenthetically, I will not forget a conversation I had 
with my colleague Zalmay Khalilzad, who became the NSC Senior 
Director for Afghanistan after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan - 
the first event that precipitated the crisis in 1979. As you are aware, 
the Reagan administration, when it came into office, mounted a 
major campaign to arm the indigenous Afghan tribes to fight the 
Soviets with Saudi support and also with the support of other Islamic 
countries. Towards the end of that campaign, the United States made 
a monumental decision which changed the course of that war. This 
was the decision to arm the Afghan rebels with Stinger missiles. 
When that decision was made, the Soviet air power superiority 
in Afghanistan essentially disappeared and Soviet forces could 
thereafter be destroyed piecemeal by the Afghan insurgents. 
I asked Zalmay many years later when both of us were at the RAND 
Corporation as to why the United States took this decision because 
it was such a fraught and risky one - we now know in retrospect 
the result of those choices. He said the United States made that 
decision because it never believed that the Soviet Union would 
leave Afghanistan or that the Soviet Union would collapse. Zalmay 
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said, “We all imagined that this was going to be a thousand years 
struggle against Soviet power.” So, even the United States was 
surprised by the success of its own Cold War strategy and even 
more so that the Soviet Union collapsed peacefully without a major 
global conflagration. 
China is going to be an entirely different challenge. This is because, 
even as we compete with China in geopolitical and military terms, 
we are deeply intertwined with it in economically. So the problem of 
‘how do you go to war with your own banker’ takes on an entirely 
different complexion; where even as you are competing with this 
country, you are helping this country grow, just as the economic 
ties that link both countries are helping your own growth as well. 
So what does competition mean in such an environment where 
you are tied so deeply in economic terms and yet are geopolitical 
rivals? The last time we saw such a development in international 
history was about the time of the First World War when Great 
Britain and Germany were tied economically even while they were 
slugging it out on the battlefield of Europe. And, if you think that 
interdependence at that time was significant, think how much 
deeper the interdependence is between the United States & China 
in the current situation. 
So the complexity of our challenge is really significant and occurs at 
a point where Chinese power is causing disequilibrium in the region, 
which in turn puts U.S. allies in a position where they are anxious 
and demand even greater American support. Yet even U.S. allies do 
not have the appetite for supporting what would otherwise be the 
default American strategy in dealing with a rising power such as 
China, i.e. containment. 
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Containment, unfortunately, is infeasible and impossible to 
implement. It is infeasible because it would mean that the United 
States would have to cut off its own economic links with China and 
go back to the kind of economic relations the United States had 
with the USSR, which were essentially non-existent. No American 
ally in Asia wants to be in a situation where the United States cuts 
off economic links with China, nor do they want to be in a position 
where the United States compels them to cut off economic links with 
China. So, we now have a peculiar difficulty where our allies want 
the United States to defend them against Chinese depredations, but 
they do not want the United States to do anything that will put at 
risk what are productive economic linkages. 
So given that containment is essentially off the table, we have to come 
up with a new strategy and that is what rebalancing is about. It is an 
effort to pull together a new strategic solution that satisfies both the 
economic demands of interdependence, while protecting the United 
States against the geopolitical risks associated with China’s rise. In 
that sense, this effort at rebalancing shares continuity with the long 
standing U.S. policy of preserving Asia whole and free. But there 
are three important twists to the new strategy.
The components of the U.S. rebalance to Asia
 First, the United States has the ambition of developing an integrated 
strategy that involves diplomatic, economic, as well as military 
components, while making the Asia-Pacific the centre piece of U.S. 
global strategy writ large. This is new. In the old days, the United 
States had integrated strategies, but the geopolitical focus was 
Europe. That has changed as a result of rebalancing. 
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Second, the administration is making the effort to expand the 
concept of Asia Pacific to include the Indian Ocean because everyone 
recognises that a successful rebalancing to Asia cannot occur if India 
is not part of the equation. Now what that means in practical terms 
has to be negotiated. And as someone who has had the pleasure of 
negotiating the Indo-U.S. civil nuclear deal, I have to tell you that 
neither will it be quick nor will it be easy. However, to exclude India 
from the definition of rebalancing would be catastrophic from the 
point of view of American interest. 
The third twist is the specific military focus on ensuring that the United 
States will be able to put in place the capabilities to defeat any effort to 
deny it the freedom to project power. There is an understanding that 
if any adversary acquires the capabilities to deny the U.S. freedom to 
project power, then essentially the rebalancing is over. Because if the 
United States is unable to deter China from misbehaving, it will not 
be able to assure its allies that they will be protected.
So in practical terms, what will the rebalancing involve? Rebalancing 
essentially involves three components.
The strategic component is the one which has acquired a lot of 
attention in the public discourse. There are many dimensions to 
this component, but the most important thing is the intention of 
the United States to maintain the requisite military capabilities in 
the region. This is important for purposes of deterrence, reassuring 
U.S. allies, and preserving the requisite ‘over the horizon’ military 
capabilities, which are capable of entering the region when 
required under conditions of necessity. This is the germ of strategic 
rebalancing, which manifests itself in many different ways. 
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The first is an effort to increase and diversify the kind of military 
presence that the United States has in Asia. The United States is no 
longer in the business of building new bases in the Asia-Pacific. 
Rather what the United States wants to do is maintain a very 
flexible network of presence where it is constantly visible; constantly 
visiting the region, constantly deploying with indigenous states and 
constantly engaging in military activities in order to build up this 
network that can help shape China’s choices. 
So to that end, the United States is focused on maintaining new 
naval force components. For example, in Singapore there will be 
modest naval presence and in Darwin, a modest marine presence; 
an effort is being made to look at Perth as a host station for new U.S. 
capabilities. The island of Guam is going to be the centre piece for 
a very significant forward military presence in Asia. So presence is 
going to be the key, but it is not a presence tied to the old Cold War 
style bases. The presence will be everywhere in flexible forms. 
The second element is developing counter-access capabilities. As all 
who follow the Chinese military know, China has made significant 
investments in what is called “Anti-Access and Area-Denial.” The 
United States wants to be able to neutralise these capabilities and 
operate as close as is necessary to the shores of the Asia-Pacific without 
putting its own assets at risk. There is a whole range of efforts, ranging 
from technology to doctrines to new concepts of operations that are 
being explored in order to be able to deliver on this task.
The third element of the strategic prong is force restructuring. For 
the foreseeable future, the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force will continue 
to enjoy far greater priority than the land components in the U.S. 
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military because everyone knows that the Indo-Pacific is a maritime 
theatre. The era of long land wars in Asia is over. Instead, the United 
States will focus on expeditionary capabilities which are centred on 
naval and air power. 
Lastly, the United States is going to focus on improving the 
capabilities of its partners. The single best investment that the United 
States can make outside of recapitalising its own military is to build 
up the capability of its friends and allies in Asia, because the strategic 
calculus is a very simple one. The stronger the powers of countries 
that exist on China’s periphery, the more limited would be China’s 
ability to misuse its power. 
Then there is the diplomatic component of the rebalancing strategy. 
The diplomatic engagement will essentially involve subtlety. The 
United States is not going to make invidious judgments about Asian 
fora as it did in the past where some organisations were dismissed 
as being talk shops and therefore unworthy of U.S. attention and 
interest. Even if they are talk shops, the United States has concluded 
that it is worth a very concerted effort to stay engaged in all 
multilateral fora, because this is part of the reassurance and shaping 
mechanism. It allows the United States to make certain that what 
happens in these multilateral fora do not rebound adversely on its 
own interests. Furthermore, the United States is going to walk a 
tightrope of deepening its alliances and strategic partnerships, while 
also doing whatever it can to improve relations with China. 
Remember, that the key to the success of the rebalance is doing exactly 
the opposite of what containment required. Containment required 
isolation of your adversaries. It also required making certain that you 
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had absolutely no ties with your competitors. Rebalancing is going to 
involve an entirely different approach. The United States will continue 
to stay engaged with China because it has no choice. Engagement in 
every issue area is inevitable, but even as that engagement deepens, 
the United States is going to continue to hedge by deepening its 
alliance relationships with its friends and partners, because the idea 
is to essentially smother China with kindness; if you can pull that off, 
then the United States will have really achieved something that is 
going to be of immense significance. It is important to recognise that 
the United States is not looking for a new fight with China. 
When people talk of rebalance, they tend to think of the rebalancing 
using the metaphors of the Cold War, to think of it as a devious 
strategy of containing the Chinese. I think that the United States has 
long recognised that when trade with China obtains at levels that 
currently exist between the United States and China, containment 
is no longer an option. The United States thus has to engage China, 
but cannot be pollyannish about the terms of its engagement. The 
United States has to recognise that even as we hope that deepened 
ties will induce China into behaving responsibly, it always has to 
prepare for contingencies. 
Part of preparing for these contingencies will be building up 
American partnerships with key states in Asia and there are a small 
number of key states that fit this definition. Japan is an obvious one 
as is Korea. To the degree that they want a relationship, Taiwan is an 
obvious one. India is an obvious one, as is Singapore and possibly 
Australia and a few others. So there will be a very concerted effort that 
the United States makes to develop its relations with these countries. 
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An important element of the diplomatic component is to emphasise 
the need to resolve disputes without recourse to force. Whether it 
is maritime issues in the South and East China Sea or continental 
disputes over borders, the principle that the United States would 
like to see enshrined is that force not be used to resolve disputes. 
The third component of rebalancing is economic and in many 
ways it is an extremely important prong. What the United States is 
attempting to do with respect to economics is twofold. It is attempting 
at one level to expand the global multilateral trading system, which 
is centred on the World Trade Organisation (WTO). In many ways, 
the WTO is America’s best and most glorious baby: begotten as a 
result of American power in the post-War period, which led to the 
creation of the global multilateral trading system. But the United 
States is very conscious that it is going to be harder and harder to 
expand the global trading system as it did in the past because the new 
nations that are entering are at a very different level of development 
compared to the mature powers that already exist in the system. 
The United States thus has to confront what is a difficult reality: how 
do you create a global multilateral trading system with a uniform 
set of rules when you have two different sets of countries involved? 
One set of countries are capital rich and developed and another set 
of countries are capital poor and underdeveloped. Though one can 
create rules, the quality of the rules will be meagre because when 
trying to reconcile interests between countries with such disparity, 
the only rule that satisfies both is the lowest common denominator. 
So yes, the United States will seek to expand the global multilateral 
trading system, but the marginal gains accruing from that expansion 
will likely be extremely modest and meagre. 
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If you follow the debates in the WTO over last several years, you 
know how difficult it has been to move even a few inches forward in 
regard to creating a global consensus. Therefore, the United States has 
embarked on a strategy that is potentially very rewarding and also 
incurs high risk. It is seeking to supplement the global expansion of 
trading regime with new preferential free trade agreements with its 
partners. The idea is simple. If you cannot expand global multilateral 
trading system at levels that you want, create subset agreements 
with partners that are mutually compatible. What you hope to get 
are higher gains from trade from such agreements. 
The United States is focussed very heavily on two preferential trading 
agreements in opposite parts of the world. One is the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) which involves eleven Asia-Pacific countries and the 
second is the US-EU Free Trade Agreement (FTA) which will essentially 
integrate the EU economies and the United States. Of course, there is the 
third area which does not get enough attention and that is revitalising 
the North-Atlantic Free Trade Area (NAFTA) because that is still the 
most productive trading centre in the global system. 
What then are the benefits and risks of such a strategy? The benefits 
are that the gains from trade would be higher for the United States if 
it were able to liberalise trade among countries that had comparable 
per capita incomes. Say, if the United States gets the Japanese to open 
markets, the gains would be much higher for the United States than 
say trading with Africa. But the risk is that the United States could 
end up creating a set of segmented arrangements that, over a period 
of time, results in the progressive atrophy of the global multilateral 
trading system. If countries that become part of preferential free trade 
agreements begin to sense that the gains from trade for them are 
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greater in preferential agreements, they will then have less incentive 
to invest in expanding the global multilateral regime.  
Thus, quite paradoxically, the United States could end up destroying 
the most valuable contribution it has made to global integration since 
the Second World War. But at this stage U.S. policy makers feel they 
have no choice. The need to compete with China is imperative and the 
need to increase the relative gains that the United States enjoys from 
trade is so important that they are willing to consider preferential 
free trade agreements at least as supplements, if not substitutes, for 
a global trading system. 
These are the three components that the administration has discussed 
when it talks of rebalancing. The idea, at the end of the day, is if all three 
components work as planned, the United States will begin to do much 
better than it did before in economic terms. That improved wealth 
and welfare performance will translate into greater availability of 
resources to the American state with respect to national defence. Those 
marginal increases in defence capabilities will in turn contribute to both 
defeating Chinese efforts to prevent the United States from being able 
to operate in Asia, while simultaneously reassuring American friends 
and allies. That, in a nutshell, is the logic of the strategy.
Other important components of U.S. Rebalancing 
There are two other components that do not receive much attention 
when people talk of rebalancing. First is the revitalisation of the 
U.S. economy. I have always believed that the success or failure of 
rebalancing will depend less on what we do abroad and much more 
on what we do at home. If the United States is not smart, it could 
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end up being very successful with respect to external initiatives 
and being extremely dumb and short sighted with respect to the 
choices it makes at home. There is no nation in history that has 
actually survived as a great power simply on strength of external 
achievements if they come at increased cost of internal weakness 
and domestic enervation. 
The second component is whether the United States will be able to 
enforce a certain degree of institutional coherence within its own 
state.  It is nice to have a strategy, but at the end of day it has to 
be implemented, and that requires you to have institutional and 
organisational coherence. The right hand must know what the left 
hand is doing. The United States was built on a system of divided 
sovereignty. It would therefore not be surprising to me if we do not 
manage the necessary institutional coherence that is required for 
success. 
Let me end by saying a few words about the risks accompanying 
each of the components of the rebalancing strategy. The biggest risk 
to the strategic component in my mind is financial. The U.S. economy 
will have to pull out of the slump that it has experienced for the 
last several years and go back to the path of being a high growth 
economy. The bad news is that pulling out of the slump has been 
much slower than anybody would like. The good news is that the 
United States has come out of slumps before and has the capacity to 
come out again. In fact, if you look at U.S. economic growth in the 
last two quarters, it has been astounding. For a mature economy to 
be growing at +3% is quite remarkable. Thus, there is reason to hope 
that if the United States can get its dysfunctional domestic politics 
in order, it might be able to reach an agreement that puts American 
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public finances on the right track and then uses those rebuilt public 
finances to make a comeback. 
The United States still has tremendous advantages as an innovation 
society. If you look at the disruptive innovations that are out there 
on the horizon, every one of them is American. Thus the United 
States has the capacity to generate what economists would call 
Schumpeterian revolutions – disruptive revolutions that really 
transform the nature of economy – and it possesses this capacity 
better than any other nation. So the hope is that over a period of 
time, if the United States gets its act together in terms of its public 
finances, in terms of creating a national consensus on where it wants 
to go, in terms of managing the dysfunctionality in its politics, it can 
begin to put the pieces back together. 
On the diplomatic component, managing a partnership with China 
and your partners simultaneously is going to test the skills of the best 
magicians.  There is always a certain degree of tension. The closer you 
come to China, the more you unnerve your partners. The closer you 
come to your partners, the more you unnerve China. There is no magic 
algorithm which allows you to figure out what the optimal solution is. 
Rather, one has to grope towards a solution and, obviously there is no 
assurance that one will end up along the path that is most productive. 
But the United States has no choice. Thus, on the diplomatic challenge, 
the real issue is going to be, can the United States do this tightrope 
walk with the adroitness that it requires for success? 
One also has to remember that this is a multi-player game. There 
is a U.S. relationship with China, there is a U.S. relationship 
with partners, and there is a relationship between partners 
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and China. There is also a relationship among the partners 
themselves, and some partners do not happen to like one 
another. Whether the United States will be able to command 
the sophistication and skill to pull this off remains another area 
where success is not certain. 
The third and the last question is economic. As I said before, I have 
a lot more confidence that the U.S. economy will make a comeback. 
What I am less certain about is if the strategy of preferential free 
trade settlements will yield the kind of rewards that we are hoping 
they will. If they do, it will be highly beneficial for the United 
States. However, the diversities of the countries the United States is 
negotiating with are so great that if there is not sufficient political 
will on all sides, one can end up getting a very low grade agreement. 
While that is a risk the United States has to take, we still do not know 
how this approach will work out. There is furthermore the huge 
question of whether, even if these preferential free trade agreements 
are successful, the United States has hammered one more nail into 
coffin of the global multilateral regime and what does that mean for 
the future of global integration? 
So if one were to take stock about the prospects of rebalancing, 
the point I would make is this: U.S. intentions are noble. These 
intentions represent continuity with a strategy that the United States 
has followed in the Asia-Pacific since end of World War II, but the 
success of this strategy is still quite uncertain. If the United States 
fails, then the Indo-Pacific region is likely to see the rise of a new 
ordering regime. It will move closer towards a world that centres on 
China and the implications of that world for many of the countries 
on China’s periphery are very significant. 
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For countries like India, Japan, Korea, and Australia, important 
nations that have proud histories and seek independent destinies, 
the success of U.S. rebalancing is vital. This is so because it is not yet 
clear to me that these countries have the capacity, either individually 
or in collaboration, to balance China independently of the United 
States. If that was the case, then the worst fears that the United States 
has with respect to Asia would be attenuated. Until the point where 
countries like Japan, India and Australia can muster the resources 
to assure themselves that they can successfully balance China, the 
best alternative for this part of the world is for U.S. rebalancing to 
be successful. Let me end on that note because I think that captures 
succinctly the stake that we all collectively have in this endeavour. 
Thank you very much!
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